Participants recommended that the United States and Pakistan model anti-ISIL efforts on the successful intelligence-sharing regime to target al-Qaeda in the years after the 9/11 attacks of 2001.
Nonetheless, both of these pathways for cooperation have precedents.
If successfully taken forward, they could help strengthen stability in Pakistan — one of the few genuinely shared interests between Washington and Islamabad.
The other notable convergence relates to border security management along the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier.
Several participants from both sides expressed robust support for reviving the border coordination center that was originally established a decade ago, but was suspended when U. The crisis was catalyzed by CIA agent Raymond Davis’ killing of two Pakistani men in Lahore, the raid on Bin Laden’s compound, and an accidental attack by NATO helicopters that killed 24 Pakistani border troops — and prompted Islamabad to close down NATO supply routes on its soil until the Obama administration apologized for the tragedy nearly a year later.
Deepening Divergences However, when it comes to the countries’ other chief concerns, our discussions reinforced what the constant tensions in U.
S.-Pakistani ties have long shown: interests and objectives simply don’t align.
S.-Pakistan ties (along with USAID, which also faces budget cuts and has already suffered job cuts).
Additionally, a senior White House South Asia official, briefing our participants in August, bluntly stated that Trump’s Pakistan policy will revolve around protecting American lives — suggesting that terrorism and security concerns will take center stage in the relationship.
The Right Time for a Track II The timing for our dialogue was propitious. “The authors of the strategy did a great disservice to U.
S.-Pakistan relations,” lamented one of our Pakistani participants. Secretary of Defense James Mattis could involve some uncomfortable discussions.